Joining the global, protecting the regional: Latin America in the post-WWII critical juncture

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Abstract: Following the Second World War, the United States advanced projects of international order-building at the global level, as well as across various regions. IR scholars have long been noted that US-led regional projects varied in nature—with leading accounts treating European projects as multilateral, Asian projects as networks of bilateralism, and the Western Hemisphere as "crudely imperial" in Ikenberry's words. These projects of regional order-building have been studied predominantly from the perspectives of the United States and, at times, other Allied great powers. While Latin America has received limited attention in the immediate post-WWII period, it offers an important site for understanding how secondary and smaller powers engaged with the simultaneous reconstitution of regional and global orders. As the region already possessed long traditions of sovereignty, diplomacy, and regional organization, Latin America was the most active group of Global South countries in shaping the postwar emergence of "liberal international order." Drawing on archival work in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and the United States, this paper explores how Latin American leaders and diplomats understood and sought to shape the interface between inter-American regional institutions and global patterns of order.

Introduction

How do regional orders "fit" into global orders? This paper seeks to better conceptualize the relationship between global and regional orders and to offer evidence of how actors understood these connections.[1] Much work on regionalism does not explicitly address this question of "fit" with the global. Within work that does, we see three approaches to understanding the regional/global relationship: analytical, juridical, and purposive approaches. All of these, however, share an often-implicit logic that the relationship between regional and global orders is vertical in nature.

We take a different path, breaking from this logic of verticality. Instead, we conceptualize global and regional orders as governance assemblages, which are relational, networked, and (often) overlapping and intertwined. In doing so, we put "relations before regions," to riff off the title of Jackson and Nexon's (1999) influential article. Furthermore, we draw on a relational approach to governance hierarchies in world politics, inspired in the work of Daniel Nexon and co-authors (Mcconaughey, Musgrave, and Nexon 2018; Nedal and Nexon 2019; Musgrave and Nexon 2018; also see MacDonald 2018).

The regional/global relationship has often been understood from the perspectives of great powers, who are seen as the drivers of top-down processes of order-building, as coercive or cooperative hegemons or as "regional core states" (Mearsheimer 2001; T. Pedersen 2002; Katzenstein 2005). In general, these approach to the connections between global and regional orders emphasizes the

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[1] Both elements are, with apologies, woefully incomplete at this stage. As you're certainly aware, it's been a helluva year.

victorious great powers that lead order-building (Ikenberry 2001). Conversely, several scholars have drawn attention to regions as sites of potential resistance to hegemonic projects (Acharya 2014; Briceño Ruiz and Simonoff 2017; Battaglino 2012). However, both roles suggest a vertical logic—either top-down or bottom-up—to the regional/global relationship.

However, if regional orders are understood as spheres of heightened great power domination, it becomes puzzling that the leaders of secondary and small states might emerge as their greatest cheerleaders. Yet, that is precisely what occurred in the Americas during the immediate post-WWII period. Understanding regional and global orders as governance assemblages invites attention to a greater attention to the roles of different actors in creating and sustaining regional and international orders without presupposing vertical logics.

Instead, using the lens of governance assemblages, this paper asks about the place of secondary states in these moments of creation. Even in moments of major systemic transformation, global and regional orders are not created *ex nihilio*. Regional orders may remain relatively cohesive even as global order experiences dynamic change—as was the case in the Americas in the post-WWII critical juncture. In this critical juncture, Latin American statesman used diplomatic and international legal means to preserve a space for their regional order. In doing so, they demonstrated significant concern for the "fit" between regional and global order, in part because changes in global order seemed to pose a challenge to the continuity of a semi-autonomous regional order.

The post-WWII moment is a frequent and exemplary case of a critical juncture for global order. It is often assumed that this moment had similar effects for regional orders (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002; Press-Barnathan 2004). A substantial body of scholarship examines the effects of this juncture on global security and economic orders; imperial orders; and regional orders in Asia and Europe. Europe's own order had been ruptured by the rise of Nazi Germany, then overturned by the war. In the post-WWII moment, the unparalleled emergence of the United States (and the Soviet Union) upended hierarchies, displacing victorious incumbent powers and defeated powers alike. In East Asia, the war also displaced leading powers, especially a defeated Japan and a fragmented China. In Africa and South Asia, imperial hierarchies were fatally weakened by the war, and governance hierarchies were destabilized (Jansen and Osterhammel 2019, 36).

Instead, we look to the position of the inter-American regional order in this critical juncture to illustrate what the governance assemblage approach offers for our understanding of the regional/global relationship. Generally, Latin America and inter-American relations have received less attention in this sense—perhaps because the rank-order of the hierarchy was largely preserved, though the relative power balance did skew increasingly toward to United States. This was very different than in Europe and East Asia, where the war displaced leading powers from atop the hierarchy (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002; Press-Barnathan 2004). Looking at the place of Latin American regional order during the post-WWII moment offers a chance to empirically unpack this connection between regional and global orders precisely because Latin America retained a relatively cohesive regional order. In fact, when seen as a governance assemblage, the Pan American system had grown much *more* cohesive immediately preceding and during the Second World War (Humphreys 1946; Long 2020, 202).

Though the Second World War had a less revolutionary effect on the inter-American regional order than it did elsewhere, the war still raised questions about the nature of the relationship between the existing regional governance assemblage and the transformations of the global governance assemblage (Trask 1977; Tillapaugh 1978; Garcia 2012; Di Tella and Watt 1990). Such questions were prominent even before the end of the war. What would become of the inter-American system,

now that the United States was the preeminent global power? How would regional governance assemblages relate, legally and practically, to the new United Nations? How would Latin America be represented as the global level? These questions were not debated or answered by great powers alone. Latin American states were deeply involved. Indeed, they were much more focused on these questions than the United States, which continued to fight a war in the Pacific, launch occupations of defeated powers, seek to rebuild Europe, and quickly started looking at Moscow at the next threat (Long 2020). Asymmetries of material capabilities were contrasted with inverse asymmetries of attention. In addition, Latin American states had a greater concentration of interests (Womack 2016; Long 2015; Darnton 2012).

As was long inferred by histories of the period, leading regional states in Latin America were relegated to a second plane in the planning of the post-WWII global order in meetings such as Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks (Helleiner 2014; Tillapaugh 1978; Murkland 1946). Exclusion from the inner sanctum of victorious great powers did not stop Latin American statesmen from seeking to influence new governance assemblages in important ways—in institutional-legal form, economic rules, human rights norms, and more (Sikkink 2014; Lutz and Sikkink 2000; Thornton 2018; Marino 2019; Long 2018).

However, such marginalization did reinforce the Latin American commitment to supporting and reforming regional governance assemblages, and drew attention to the nature of the connection between regional and global orders. By examining regional and global orders as governance assemblages, we can better illuminate the connections between them—as well as showing how actors fashioned their engagements with the different, though overlapping, "jurisdictions"[2] that these assemblages created or promised to create.

Literature review: Understanding the regional—global linkages

Much work on regions and regionalism leaves the connection between regional and global orders undertheorized, even when extra-regional actors and forces are salient in the empirical analysis. For example, work that compares regions and the designs of regional institutions tends to treat regions as *sui generis*; regions' patterns of integration, cooperation, and conflict are explored on their own terms (Börzel et al. 2013; Panke 2020; Jetschke et al. 2020). In a broader sense, global dynamics may act as restrictive or permissive conditions for regional integration. Global factors, like increasing multipolarity, may be treated as exogenous shocks to patterns of regional development (Garzón 2017). For comparative studies of regionalisms and regional institutions, if regions are treated as comparable cases, the implicit logic is that global conditions are a) constant enough for the regions compared; and, b) permissive of regional variation. However, these assumptions overlook the (likely) possibility that global order—or in the case of Katzenstein, the global hegemon—may have fundamentally different relations with and effects on different regions. It has been suggested that regional orders might represent a form of "hierarchy under anarchy" (Wendt and Friedheim 1995) or "hierarchy in anarchy" (Donnelly 2006). Donnelly offers "regional hegemonies" as an example of hierarchies under anarchies, which could exist under global systems characterized by different authority relations (156). These approaches assume more hierarchical regional containers, loosely tethered in an anarchical international system.

In other bodies of work on regionalism, there is greater explicit attention to the question of regional/global connections. Still, existing answers are largely unsatisfactory. In our assessment of the

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[2] Thanks to Luis Rodríguez Aquino for suggesting this term, and for a helpful formative discussion on this subject.

literature, the relationship of regional and global orders has been understood in three broad ways: analytical, juridical, or purposive. Below we discuss the analytical, juridical, and purposive approaches to the regional/global connection. However, we also see a division within each approach—with varying salience—regarding the ontological status of the region. Within each of those approaches, regions can be understood either as *components* of global order or *agents* within the global order (see Table 1). For some, regions are simply a component of a larger system (be that an analytical, legal, or purposive political system). For others, regions possess greater cohesiveness and can be treated as independent sites of agency. In the following, we identify limitations to all these approaches and argue instead that both regional and global orders should be seen as assemblages of governance relationships.

Table 1

	Ontological status of regions	
Approach to regional/global	*Component*	*Agent*
Analytical	Level of analysis (subsystem)	"Actorness"
Juridical	Delegation	Subsidiarity
Purposive	Sphere of influence	Counterhegemonic

Analytical approaches

The first broad approach to conceptualizing the regional/global linkage is to treat the distinction simply as an analytical choice. For the most part, analytical approaches to the regional/global relationship treats regions as a component of a global system, though some approaches with "new regionalism" have greater analytical attention to the potential of regions as agents (Hettne and Söderbaum 2000; Riggirozzi 2012). For much "new regionalism," for example, global conditions may be more permissive for regionalism, but the level of "regionness" emerges from intrinsic levels of regionalization (Hettne and Söderbaum 2000, 430). Acharya (2014, 653) sees regions as "layers of governance" that have taken on greater salience in the "multiplex world order."

Perhaps the most prominent analytical approach is to treat regions and regional order simply as an intervening level of analysis, sandwiched between the nation-state and the global systemic level. This turns the region into a component, or subsystem, or the international system. As two proponents of this approach argue, "Regions have analytical, and even ontological, standing, but they do not have actor quality" (Buzan and Waever 2003, 27). Regions are analytical components of the international system, which should be recognized because geographical proximity has implications for security and economic affairs. Buzan and Waever (2003, 19, 17–20) argue for a "global world order of strong regions," with regions often relatively autonomous of global security structures and dynamics, at least after the breakdown of imperial hierarchies.

For Buzan and Waever, regions are for the most part a level of analysis that sits below the global and above the state, which add an emphasis on territoriality to more abstract realist notions of international systems (29-30). Regional "clusters must be embedded in a larger system, which has a structure of its own" (27), and therefore are "substructures of the international system" (48). Because of their emphasis on levels of analysis, Buzan and Waever reiterate the need to draw clear analytical distinctions between the regional/global levels, calling for "disciplined separation … of the global level from the regional" [82; see their rejoinder to (Lake and Morgan 2010) on p. 78-82].

The regional level largely replicates the security logics of the global level, especially relating to patterns of polarity under anarchy: "Anarchy plus the distance effect plus geographical diversity

yields a pattern of regionally based clusters" (46). Regions are defined by from the top-down. The "global level is about macrosystem structures", and these structures shape the possibilities and nature of the regional level (28). However, Buzan and Waever are hemmed in by their essentially structural approach and their commitment to anarchy. They often invoke a more relational approach to discuss the density of interactions among states, referring to "clusters of nodes" and "interlinked" security concerns (44). But they do not define regions through those relational networks; instead they advocate a "top-down" approach. For Buzan and Waever the main mechanism that connects global and regional levels is "penetration" (46). By this, they mean the interposition of extra-regional states, especially great powers, in the security dynamics of a region.

An additional problem is that while this levels-of-analysis approach can incorporate systemic logics, it is inattentive to variations in order. Regions "fit" into the global system by replicating systemic logics, but writ smaller. These logics may emphasize greater interaction density at the regional level—of economic transactions (Nye 1968; Haas and Schmitter 1964), security interactions (Buzan and Waever 2003), and cultural connections (Paul 2012, 4–5; Acharya 2011). This eschews the question of "fit", however. Nor does is this levels-based approach helpful for understanding relationships that crisscross analytical divisions between regional and global.

Juridical approaches

Perhaps the most prominent approach in the history of diplomatic practice, and particularly in the Latin American case below, is to consider the regional/global linkage as a question of juridical frameworks. That is, the nature of the relationship is a question for international law to define. Legal frameworks should specify how the regional and global levels "fit", and where certain prerogatives lie. One can envision two broad approaches to this question. In the first, the global legal order delegates certain rights and duties to regional orders but retains residual rights. In the second, residual rights remain at the regional order (e.g., subsidiarity), which might then delegate certain rights and duties to actors and institutions of the global order.

During World War II and the early postwar period, great powers and smaller states debated whether "residual rights" to make decisions about security and economic rules would remain with the (inter-American) region or whether these rights would rest with a global organization and then be delegated. Latin American states generally preferred what me might consider a principle of subsidiarity, with the central authority only handling security issues if these spilled beyond the region or if the regional was unable to address them. Article 51 of the United Nations Charter represented a compromise on this point (Kunz 1947).

In general, subsidiarity is understood as a possible solution to "the vertical distribution of powers in multilevel systems," with flexibility about the specific definition of those levels (Jachtenfuchs and Krisch 2016, 1). Acharya refers to the post-WWII emergence of regionalism as a "subsidiarity model" in which non-great powers sought to retain autonomy within their regions through a juridical approach (Acharya 2018, 159; 2011).[3] However, this discussion of subsidiarity has been most prominent, perhaps, not to explain the regional/global connection but to address sovereign rights and supranational prerogatives in the European Union (Van Kersbergen and Verbeek 2004; Warleigh-Lack and Van Langenhove 2010). It is also prominent within federal states. That this issue reappears

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[3] It should be noted that Acharya sometimes invokes "subsidiarity" in a strictly juridical sense and sometimes in a more purposive sense "to preserve their autonomy from dominance, neglect, violation, or abuse by more powerful central actors" (Acharya 2011, 95).

in this way, we argue, suggests the utility of approaching such governance connections as assemblages instead of analytical levels or juridical layers.

While this juridical approach was salient in post-WWII diplomacy and is common to describe to postwar compact, it can risk becoming ahistorical, and often produces anachronisms, if one attempts to generalize it. Regional juridical systems often pre-existed international ones, with little attention to "fit" with the global. Even the League of Nations had little evident juridical relation to regions, only noting in Article 21 that the League Covenant should be understood as compatible with regional accords.[4] Benton and Ford point to British commercial expansion as a driver of the international expansion of such a set of legal order, and clearly colonial expansion was closely wedded to the expansion of international law (Benton and Ford 2016; Anghie 2007). The notion of juridical approaches to the issue of regional/global order was to an extent a product of the post-WWII moment, which then gained traction as an explanatory approach.

Purposive approaches

Finally, a great deal of work on regions does not explicitly answer the question of how regional and global orders fit, but instead asks what purposes regions serve in international politics. In doing so, the question of "fit" subtly slips from conceptualizing the relationship between regional and global orders to ascribing various purposes to regional projects. In doing so, these discussions move from asking "*how do regions fit*" to "*what do regions do*"—and on whose behalf?

One purposive perspective has deep geopolitical roots: regions are treated as components of a global geopolitical system, especially as the spheres of influence (actual or potential) of great powers. In this approach, regions serve a purposive function as a component of global order. From the position of great powers, regional orders may "fit" as their own spheres of influence or zones of imperial prerogative Though his analysis is nominally about relations amongst great powers, Mearsheimer relies heavily on this geopolitical role of regions (Mearsheimer 2001, chap. 5). For him, the logical purpose of great powers is to seek regional hegemony, and regions are defined by geographical features (e.g., "the stopping power of water") that delimit them from the zones of other great powers. This, too, has been a frequent treatment of the inter-American system in discussions of global order, premised on the idea of negligible Latin American agency (Long 2018, 1386–87).

With explicit attention to regions—and a different theoretical approach—Katzenstein (2005) also sees regions as serving a political purpose as the functional components of the "American imperium." For Katzenstein (2005, 179), regions "fit" in the sense that they are structured by "vertical links that connect regions to American imperium." These links pass through "regional core states" that support the exercise of US power. Regional orders may take quite different forms, but these forms are heavily influenced by the nature of US relations with the region, and not by regional actorness (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002). Speaking of the Americas, Katzenstein (Katzenstein 2005, 225–26) writes "this constellation yields a distinctive regionalism that interacts with the American imperium on the basis of informal rule, patron-client relations, coercive diplomacy, and military interventions," adding "The Americas, one might think, should feature European-style regionalism. They do not." The reason has nothing to do with Latin Americans, and everything to do with the US, Katzenstein argues.

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[4] "Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." The Covenant of the League of Nations, via Avalon Project, Yale University. Online: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.

For some, however, the regional/global connection is approaches defined by purpose, but from an approach that departs from the region up. Here, regions may "fit" into the global as areas of resistance to, or negotiation with, hegemonic projects. Though Acharya lists various ways that regional orders may empirically relate to global order—ranging from great powers' spheres of influence to zones of resistance to hegemonic projects (Acharya 2014, 654)—he is perhaps best known as a proponent of the region as a site for resistance to hegemonic and imperial projects. Such non-hegemonic regional orders may have a more ideational basis, linked to "shared conceptions of history and culture" (Acharya 2018, 156).

This can be clearly contrasted with Katzenstein's logic, which is explicitly top-down from the global hegemon to the regional level. Acharya tends to see regions as more locally rooted, so the (counterhegemonic) logic is more bottom-up. He argues that "regionalist ideologies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America were geared to anti-colonialism, national liberation, protecting sovereignty, and challenging the dominance of big powers (as with Latin America's resistance to the Monroe Doctrine)" (Acharya 2018, 156).

Despite their differing directionalities, for Acharya and Kaztenstein case the question of "fit" is largely about the purpose of regions, especially divergence regarding regional contestation or acceptance of vertical authority relations. As such, the "purpose of regions" is an important question, but one that when seen from a perspective of governance assemblages tends to produce empirical variation. Yet many answers of the connection between regional and global orders adopt this as an explanatory and generalizable approach. Purpose and fit, we assert, are ultimately different matters.

Missed approaches?

What is striking about all of these three approaches (and six "sub-approaches") is that the share a similar underlying logic that the regional-to-global connection is a vertical one that runs, generally, state—region—global. At first glance, a focus on governance hierarchies is fully consistent with this, as hierarchical relationships are generally understood as "vertical relations" (Zarakol 2017, 144:1). Even the component-agent tension is evident is more recent discussions of the co-constitution of US hegemony (Kat 2020) or international order (Tourinho 2021). This duality is echoed through a hierarchical lens by Zarakol (2017, 144:5), who writes, "International society has, in other words, promulgated hierarchies because they give incentives to super- and subordinates to support and conform to the order it values. The trade-off explanation has also been deployed to account for the creation of regional orders."

However, we argue this application of vertical logics to the regional-global connection is too limiting and often leads to incorrect conclusions. It goes too far in reifying regional and global order, bestowing upon them a unity and actorness they do not possess. (For this reason, perhaps, Buzan and Waever remain wedded to anarchy as their international ordering principle.) One order cannot recognize authority relations with another order, because orders are not actors. Rather, *order* describes the rules, norms, and institutions that characterize a particular governance assemblage.

As Mcconaughey et al., note, international politics incorporates many governance assemblages, which themselves include multitudinous actors (including non-state actors). Assemblages are not confined within certain analytical levels. Indeed, they may bridge the domestic-international divide without clear distinction. Furthermore, one actor may be a "node" in multiple governance assemblages: importantly for our purposes, this means states will negotiate their positions in "global" assemblages as well as "regional" assemblages. These multiple assemblages may be "simultaneously autonomous, but interdependent" (Mcconaughey, Musgrave, and Nexon 2018, 189). The actors in that assemblage

likely belong to multiple assemblages, with patterns of governance characterized by diverse rules, norms, and institutions.

Assemblages are a broad and flexible approach to understanding governance relationships and hierarchies. Assemblages are relational and better depicted as networks (though not egalitarian) than as levels of analysis or pyramids of vertical hierarchy. An assemblage need not be as defined or formalized as an inter-governmental organization. Still, not everything is an assemblage. One may have an international system or a collection of actors that does not form an assemblage, in the sense that there are no ties of governance or networked coordination. However, a global *order*, as opposed to simply an international system, will itself display characteristics of governance assemblages. Likewise, a regional *order* will display characteristics of a governance assemblage, nested and intertwined with the global assemblage. These nodes are likely to overlap in the sense of sharing nodes, but they will be constituted by different relationships. This conceptualization of the regional/global connection helps us better understand moments of change, and the negotiation of such relationships by actors. We now turn to developing this argument.

Argument

Our theoretical wager is two-fold. First, we conceptualize both regional and global orders as "hierarchal assemblages" of governance arrangements (Mcconaughey, Musgrave, and Nexon 2018). This is a view of hierarchy that is deeply relational (MacDonald 2018, 130), but much more networked than Lake's (2009) conception of hierarchy as a product of rational exchange. Secondly, we argue that the assemblages of regional governance hierarchies are usually "nested" within global order. The governance arrangements of that global order may be quite loose, and in some case may be more "multi-regional" than fully universal.[5] The nature of the relationship, then, will be shaped by the robustness of the regional and the global governance assemblages, as well as by the agency of actors (especially states) that serve as the nodes of those assemblages. The nested features of governance assemblages help us better understand the positions of non-hegemonic actors and their abilities to shape or "co-constitute" patterns of international order (Tourinho 2021; Long 2018; Acharya 2018).

The concept of assemblages is helpful in differentiating from hub-and-spokes and building blocks approaches to the regional/global connection. In a hub-and-spokes model, secondary states primary connections go through the great power. Pillar or building-blocks approaches treat regions as self-contained pieces of a larger global structure. Katzenstein's approach to American Imperium is hierarchical on its face, given the emphasis on a US-centered "hub-and-spokes" approach. However, Katzenstein (2005, 10) is agnostic on regional hierarchy, describing the North Atlantic order as egalitarian and the Asian order as hierarchical. As noted above, regional order is a vertically linked, purposive component of US-led global order. Meanwhile, Mearsheimer's emphasis on regional hegemony suggests hierarchical arrangements at the regional level, but any such "governance arrangements" (not Mearsheimer's term), are linked vertically to the hegemon and not the global order. Mearsheimer treats the global system as anarchical, suggesting an absence of governance—though his contrast to "world government" sets the governance bar almost impossibly high (Mearsheimer 2001, chap. 10).

In contrast, we argue that regional order of any meaningful sort implies the existence of a governance assemblage. Assemblages are more networked in form. "Patterns of governance relations assemble to create overlapping and nesting political formations. These operate within, across, and among

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[5] One can imagine autarkic regional orders where the governance assemblage is separate from global assemblages, but these would be unlikely to remain hermetic in the modern states system.

sovereign states" (Mcconaughey, Musgrave, and Nexon 2018, 182). States may have a tighter network of connections within their regional hierarchical structure while also have a network on connections that connects them to the global hierarchical assemblage. This local—global linkages need not pass through a regional power or regional organization.

Such regional assemblages can vary dramatically in form, purpose, formality, and design (Acharya and Johnston 2007). Governance assemblages need not be supernational, deeply formalized, or require extensive pooling or delegation of sovereignty (Lake 2007). In cases of weak regionalism, this may imply only "strategies of orchestration" (Mcconaughey, Musgrave, and Nexon 2018, 197). Global *order* (as opposed to system) also implies the existence of a governance assemblage. However, if a regional assemblage is nested within the global assemblage, that suggests that regional governance assemblages should generally be more robust than the global assemblage. By "robust" we mean there should be greater shared recognition of rules, institutions, norms, and processes to structure relationships.[6] This robustness is not solely a question of geography, "interaction density," or shared historical and cultural ties, but of governance arrangements. If a regional assemblage is less robust than the global assemblage in which it is nested, it may not meet the threshold for "regional order."

The concept of "assemblages" recognizes the variety of governance patterns within the region—and not just subhierarchies of pro-US "regional core states" (Katzenstein 2005, 179). It also recognizes patterns of governance arrangements that bridge states, regions, and global. When connections between various assemblages—or the actors that belong to those assemblages—are robust, then changes in one assemblage will have implications for other assemblages. As we discuss empirically below, changes to the dynamics of the global assemblage can reshape how regional orders connect to global order, to other regional orders, and to the states within the region. In addition, states within a given region will form part of global assemblages, and those relationships need not be mediated by the regional level—whether by regional order or by a regional core state or regional hegemon. The model is one of overlapping networks of governance relations, in which the tendency will be for regional orders to exhibit more robust governance hierarchies.

But more hierarchical in what way? McConaughey et al. (2018, 199), suggest various ideal typical forms of governance assemblages, which vary along three dimensions: central authority autonomy [from high to low autonomy], the nature of contracting [from uniform to heterogeneous], and the investiture of authority [from center to segments or from segments to center]. These dimensions produce a three-dimensional property space, along with eight ideal types occupying the corners of the "cube" (195). These differences are matters of degree, especially in a world of formally sovereign states. "In sovereign state systems, the right of investiture remains *de jure* tied to the governments of sovereign states" (Mcconaughey, Musgrave, and Nexon 2018, 199). Similarly, the center possesses a low degree of autonomous authority over the other states in the assemblage. For this reason, sovereign states often "produce interstate governance hierarchies, in both 'formal' and 'informal' varieties, with significant confederative elements" (200). In modern examples of global order, the investment of authority at the broadest level has generally been highly segmentary. The creation of global multilateral organizations required some investiture of authority from segments to the center. It also created some additional uniformity in contracting, though in general a high degree of heterogeneity

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[6] There are exceptions to this, of course, elements of a global assemblage might order hierarchical relationships in a robust fashion. The post-WWII UN trusteeship or the post-WWI mandates system formalized such colonial (but non-regional) relationships as part of global order (S. Pedersen 2015; Mazower 2009).

remained. If we use this approach, we can begin to consider different forms of linkage between regional and global governance assemblages.

When we compare regional orders to global order, the regional level will tend to exhibit greater uniformity of contracting and greater investiture of authority in the center. When the central authority supplements its de jure authority with more coercive exercises of power, a regional order may take on greater aspects of asymmetric federation. It is important to specify that in most regional orders, "the center" will not refer to a supranational regional organization. As in most things, the European Union is more exception than rule. Instead, "the center" will refer to the power(s) that occupy the top rung of the hierarchy.

However, greater degrees of central investiture and uniformity in contracting existed in some regions. Pan Americanism created a growing body of shared rights and duties that nominally applied to all states, suggesting a movement towards more universal contracting—though ratification was notoriously low (Levick and Schulz 2020, 535). The United States never fully implemented this universality, and it retained a high degree of autonomy, which prevented more fully confederal arrangements (Petersen and Schulz 2018; Yepes 1930; Sotomayor 1996). However, there were real changes in regional order, for example, reshaping more imperial US-led governance assemblages in Central America and the Caribbean and making them more confederal, though they remained highly asymmetric and the United States at times exempted itself from the rules (Friedman and Long 2015).

Such assemblages are, in part, purposefully built and in part the product of piecemeal change and unintended consequences. While regional and global governance assemblages are subject to renegotiation and forms of gradual change, they are likely to also display significant elements of path dependence. As Ikenberry (1998, 45–46) noted, global institutions tend to be "sticky" because they "lock in" bargains among states and then tend to create increasing returns. However, major wars are often understood as critical junctures for the global and regional orders precisely because they may overturn path dependent processes (Ikenberry 2001; Gilpin 1981). Major wars are turning points for order in part because wars can disrupt the hierarchies on which international order rests.

If a major war overturns the hierarchies that underpinned both the regional and global governance assemblages, then one might expect actors to more explicitly seek to design the linkage between them. This seems to be the model that Katzenstein has in mind in describing "American imperium" in Asia and Europe. As noted, however, the inter-American regional governance assemblage had grown considerably more robust shortly before and during the Second World War. This contrast of a global order in flux and a more consolidated regional order spurred debates about the form of linking the two orders, giving many non-hegemonic actors both means and reasons to try to shape this debate. These debates had important implications for the creation of global governance assemblages,[7] and they illustrate how actors saw the regional/global relationship at a moment of change.

Regional/global assemblages in the post-WWII juncture

From roughly late 1944 through late 1945, Latin American diplomats were deeply engaged in practical and juridical questions about the "fit" between regional and global order. Contrasted with Europe and Asia, at least, the regional order preceded the global order, and it remained robust—though hardly unchanged (Long 2020). This section will examine some of those debates as they played out in two major diplomatic conferences, the regional Chapultepec Conference and the global

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[7] For example, Tine Hanrieder (2015) shows how the existing of the Pan American Health Organization creating dynamics of regionalism and layering within the World Health Organization.

San Francisco Conference, and in related diplomatic discussions. These two events focused especially on the creation of the United Nations, as the core governance assemblage, also intended to be the "most global" governance arrangement. The international-legal structure of the UN Charter created a governance assemblage with a host of norms, rules, and institutions that claimed preeminence over the regional order. This assemblage exhibited elements of hierarchy in that sense; it was also evidently hierarchical in giving special rights and prerogatives to the veto-wielding permanent members of the UN Security Council. The creation of the United Nations did not entirely close discussions about how these orders would "fit" together. The 1947 Rio Conference sought to address this "fit" in matters of security and the 1948 Bogotá Conference did so for questions of political organization. Because the broad parameters of regional-global fit had been agreed to in 1945—with significant Latin American engagement—these two events focused more on regional order-building in recognition of new global norms and institutions with direct bearing on the regional order.

In the Americas, regional governance hierarchies were reconstituted, solidified, and made more exclusive of extra-hemispheric powers, but the hierarchy was not fundamentally upended (Long 2020). The United States remained the leading power before and after the war; the tier of secondary powers also remained similar, with Brazil and Mexico buttressing their places through support of the United States (Garcia 2012; Moura 2013; Jones 2014). Arguably, only Argentina experienced a notable change, declining to the lower rungs of that secondary tier (Schenoni 2017; Di Tella and Watt 1990). Still, there were two important changes. First, there was a renegotiation of aspects of that order in political organization, security and, less so, in economics (Long 2020; Thornton 2018). In this sense, the inter-American regional governance assemblage was reconstituted in the post-WWII period. It preserved its asymmetric nature, in which Latin American states retained autonomy within certain bounds. Those bounds constituted the nature of authority relations in the US-topped hierarchical governance assemblage.

While Latin American leaders did not discuss regional assemblages as "hierarchical"— they were prone to emphasize juridical sovereign equality (Sikkink 1996; Lorca 2014, 327–52; Finnemore and Jurkovich 2014)—they were consciously creating structures of governance. They also frequently recognized the United States as having "special responsibilities," especially at a global level. They accepted, with some complaint, clearly hierarchical features of the new global order like the UNSC veto.[8] At the same time, most Latin American leaders had great concerns about the way in which "nesting" of the regional governance structure within the global hierarchical assemblage might harm their interests.

A Pan American World?

Perhaps the first issue for Latin Americans regarding the "fit" between regional and global orders is that they wanted to have a seat at the table to decide such matters. This echoed a long push from Latin America to overcome recurring dynamics of marginalization in the making of global rules, already prominent at The Hague in 1907 (Finnemore and Jurkovich 2014; Schulz 2017) and in ambivalence towards the League of Nations after 1919 (Garcia 1994; Herrera León 2016; McPherson and Wehrli 2015). Latin Americans cared deeply about how global governance assemblages were structured and how they "fit" with regional assemblages. This was evident even early in the Second World War, both in regional diplomacy and the influential work of international lawyers. In 1942, the Inter-American

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[8] An officialist Mexican newspaper said such great power dominance in security governance was "natural," adding "The States represented in Dumbarton Oaks not only have carried the shocking weight of the current conflict, but they will also have to bear what another conflict of the same or greater magnitude in the future." El Universal, October 10, 1944.

Juridical Committee, in its Preliminary Recommendation on Post War Problems, "strongly favoured the establishment of a general international organization, reconciling the principle of universality of membership with the existence of regional groups 'formed by natural bonds of solidarity and common interests'" (Humphreys 1946, 80).

This reiterated as the great powers' postwar planning came into focus in mid-1944. Latin Americans began to push back against their peripheral role in planning processes that led to the Dumbarton Oaks conference. Complaining to Mexican colleagues in August 1944, Cuban Minister Mañach "manifested in a lively voice that Cuba considered that the moment had arrived for Latin American counties to propose their future situation and to be taken into account in the deliberations about the Post War that are ongoing between the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China."[9] Mexico advanced its own plans for postwar organization and Brazilian diplomats called for greater Latin American involvement—even as Brazil was being suggested for a permanent seat without its knowledge (Garcia 2012, 105–11).

Interestingly, one vision of "fit" that had considerable popularity in Latin America during the war was that the global level should be a replication of the Pan American regional level. In 1944, the Cuban minister Pedro Cué floated proposals that "the Panamerican Union could be the model of future world coexistence."[10] The Mexican foreign minister Ezequiel Padilla made similar arguments (Padilla 1945). This is nearly the inverse of logics that expect regional subsystems to replicate global systems, such as in polarity and balance of power. Nor was this an isolated episode. Prominent Latin American diplomats claimed influence on the design of the League of Nations, as when Yepes (1930, 126) wrote that the League of Nations possessed a "physiognomy that belonged to the Western Hemisphere" and possessed distinctively (Pan) American characteristics.[11]

As the Dumbarton Oaks plans filtered out to the diplomatic corps and press, Latin Americans opposed a global assemblage that would eliminate regional arrangements. They also questioned a model in which the global organization would control the delegation of tasks to the regional. Latin Americans most clearly objected to reports the Dumbarton Oaks would supersede regional governance assemblages that may be better suited to address "problems of a regional nature". Instead, the Brazilian Ambassador in London worried that "the maintenance of peace and the development of international collaboration in the whole world pertain to the program of action of a sole organism of worldwide security."[12] Mexico, Brazil, and semi-exiled Argentina began to invoke antecedent norms of Pan American consultation in their growing calls for more formal inclusion of Latin America in discussions of both the new institutions of global order and the issue of "fit" with the regional.[13]

Despite the strong penchant for regionalism, Latin American countries did not envision exclusive regional order. They were supportive of the construction of more robust assemblages of global governance. These includes, unanimously it seems, the eventual United Nations, but many also supported more robust and binding courts and arbitration mechanisms at the global level. Brazil's

[9] J. Rubén Romero (Mexican Ambassador in Cuba) to SRE, August 17, 1944, Folder III-635-1(6a), SRE-MEX
[10] José Gorostiza to SRE, tele. 659, Actividades del Doctor Pedro Cué, April 28, 1944, Folder III-634-1(5a), SRE-MEX
[11] See also Long and Schulz, forthcoming.
[12] Brazilian Embassy in London to the Minister, A Conferência de Dumbarton Oaks, October 11, 1944, AHIR, L651 M9803
[13] Rodolfo Garcia Arias (Embassy of Argentina) to Cordell Hull, October 27, 1944, [Portuguese translation] AHIR, L1706 M35449; Fernando Lobo, Conferência de Dumbarton Oask, October 25, 1944, AHIR, L651 M9803; Flora Lewis, Padilla insinúa que habrá junta de cancilleres, Excelsior, October 16, 1944, AHIR, 32/3/1 Mexico Oficios 1944.

foreign ministry, in response to Dumbarton Oaks, underscored "the imperious and urgent necessity to establish a new international organization capable of effectively maintaining peace and security in the world." However, Brazil (thinking of its own potential permanent seat) insisted that the Security Council's "promptness and efficiency of action" would require that South America have "a permanent place in its core."[14]

Smaller countries, with no prospect of permanent Security Council membership, tended to emphasize regional preeminence and a more juridical basis of governance assemblage that emphasized robust, uniform contracting in the regional assemblage with looser global arrangements. Uruguay argued that plans should start with "a pact for mutual guarantee of political independence and territorial integrity of the American nations, complemented by the elements that exist in that sense in American Law and their due coordination with the system of world security."[15] Costa Rica's response to Dumbarton Oaks also emphasized regional precedence: "The recognition of regional arrangements is useful for coordination of the interest of the States, since it facilitates understanding for common purposes derived especially from geographic situation." Still, Costa Ricans cared substantially about the position of small states in the global arrangements, advocating ten suggested improvements including greater rights for General Assembly, a fixed place on the UNSC for Latin America, broader coverage for the international court, mechanisms of pacific settlement, incorporation of the International Labour Organisation, and clearer commitment to the promotion of human rights.[16]

In its response to Latin American pressures about Dumbarton Oaks, the United States agreed that greater discussion was needed of the "further development of the inter-American system in order that it may provide regional arrangements and agencies to deal effectively with such matters as are appropriate for regional action by the American Republics." However, it insisted that such discussions could only be preliminary, because the role of regions could only be fixed "after the world security organization is more fully developed."[17] The discussion over the nature of the governance assemblages and the nature of their relationship in security and economic matters led to the Chapultepec Conference in early 1945. When suggesting the agenda for that conference, the United States State Department recognized that there were effectively three issues of concern: the nature of "world organization," "the further development of the inter-American system," and "its relations to world organization."[18]

In reality, there were disagreements within the US government about whether to strengthen inter-American arrangements or advocate the incorporation of Latin American states into the global assemblage with little regional consideration. Views ranged for Leo Pasvolsky's substantial discounting of regional order to views expressed by Sumner Welles as early as 1942 that a strong inter-American system should be a "cornerstone of the world structure of the future" (qtd. in Humphreys 1946, 75). By 1945, Welles had been forced out of government, but such views maintained support from figures like Joseph Grew and Nelson Rockefeller. This led to contradictions in policy. "United States officials followed divergent policies that failed to coordinate agreements

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[14] Ministerio de Relações Exteriores, Memorandum, November 4, 1944, AHIR, L651 M9803; Brazilian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs [Velloso] to American Charge d'Affaires, Brazilian comment on Dumbarton Oaks proposals, November 4, 1944, Harry N. Howard Papers, Box 5, HSTPL.

[15] Government of Uruguay, Memorandum, November 23, 1944, AHIR, L1706 M35449.

[16] Embassy of Costa Rica, Establishment of an International Organization, translation, December 5, 1944, Harry N. Howard Papers, Box 5, HSTPL. On Latin American human rights commitments at this moment, see (Sikkink 2019, 66–84)

[17] US Embassy in Rio de Janeiro, No. 2354, December 23, 1944, AHIR, L1706 M35449

[18] US Embassy in Rio de Janeiro, January 6, 1945, L1706 M35449, AHIR.

among the great powers with commitments to local neighbors" (Tillapaugh 1978, 26). Latin America perceived this disconnect between Dumbarton Oaks and inter-American agreements as a threat to regional governance arrangements, on the one hand, and to the place of Latin American states in the new global assemblage, on the other.

In this moment, a number of quite innovative proposals surfaced for ways to connect regional and global governance assemblages, which diverge from the treatment of them as distinct levels. Some of these were closely linked to subsidiary, the idea that "the pacific settlement of a dispute will be sought initially through regional and local procedures." Other ideas suggested quite different arrangements, in which global and regional mechanisms would be intertwined. In a brainstorming letter to the Brazilian Ambassador Carlos Martin, Assistant Secretary Nelson Rockefeller asked, "Should the International Court of Justice be utilized as the judicial organ of the inter-American system?"[19]

Nor was it clear whether decisions about security enforcement would be initiated within regional or global order. Alongside the UNSC veto, the issue of where ultimate governance authority in security rested would generate the greatest contestation from Latin Americans at this conjuncture. With its chances for a permanent seat diminishing, Brazil enunciated a stronger regionalist position, too, that the UNSC would "never intervene" in the Americas and that "The decisions of the Security Council would be executed in the American continent by its own states."[20] This position gained steam at the Chapultepec meetings—formally known as the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace— and was a key motivation for seeking to strengthen regional governance arrangements.

One of Brazil's most influential diplomats proposed including much more exclusive regional arrangements, including draft language for the UN Charter: "The solution for questions of exclusive interest of an already organized regional group, as in the case of the inter-American group, should be left to the methods used among the components of that group in such a way that the intervention of the Security Council will only be justified when the matters endanger the peace of another group of nations."[21] Very similar language was later adopted in declaration by several Latin American states in May 1945, though with a greater nod to the need for being "compatible with ends and purposes of the United Nations."[22] Brazil also carried this view into San Francisco, advocating the precedence of inter-American governance over global arrangement, alongside the need for Latin American representation on the UNSC (Garcia 2012, 175–76).

The advances in the robustness of regional governance assemblages were clear, including the formalization of permanent representation on the PAU Governing Board and moving the board considerably closer to being a multilateral political council able to take binding decisions. Though the proposals for formalizing the inter-American system were "revolutionary" in the words on an early academic observer, "What, however, the Mexico City Conference did not do was to define the relationship of the Pan American system, whose renovation was thus prepared, to the future United Nations Organization" (Humphreys 1946, 83). That question remained unsettled when the Chapultepec conference concluded on March 8, 1945. As one Brazilian historian concludes, "Dumbarton Oaks had consecrated globalism. San Francisco reconciled the global with regionalism" (Garcia 2012, 171).

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[19] Nelson Rockefeller to Carlos Martins, letter, January 30, 1945, L1706 M35449, AHIR.
[20] Pedro Leão Velloso, instructions to Brazilian delegates, February 5, 1945, AHIR, L1707 M35454
[21] Hildebrando Accioly, Observações da delegação do Brasil sobre o plano de Dumbarton Oaks (copy for Mexico), AHIR, February 26, 1945, L1920 M36439-41.
[22] Delegations of Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Peru, Joint draft amendment to Chapter XIII, Section C of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, May 6, 1945, Harry N. Howard Papers, Box 5, HSTPL

[ADDED DISCUSSION OF SAN FRANCISCO AND AFTERMATH NEEDED HERE.]

Conclusions

Conceptualizing global and regional orders, and the connections amongst them, as governance assemblages helps unpack several elements of this critical juncture. First, contrasted with great power-centered accounts of the creation of orders, thinking in terms of assemblages allows greater nuance about the position of non-hegemonic actors. These states are nodes both in global and regional assemblages, and they will negotiate their positions in both. Unlike in Katzenstein's vision, this ability goes beyond "regional core states" and is not constrained to hub-and-spokes relations with the hegemon.

Second, it allows for an understanding of the regional/global linkage that improves upon those in the literature. Regional and global orders are more than mere analytical levels; even if these orders do not have coherent "actorness," they do exhibit features of governance. Just as we can envision varying types of governance assemblages, the regional/global connection can take different forms. These may include formal, juridical arrangements (like UN Charter Article 51), but they need not be limited to international law. Finally, the conceptualization of these linkages through the idea of governance assemblages is a more direct approach to the question of "fit" than the frequent recourse to the "purpose" of regions. Thinking of patterns of governance relationships avoids the risk of reifying the region (especially in the case of "resistance") or assuming away the agency of actors within the region (as in a sphere of influence).

Within their regional assemblage, Latin America pushed for more multilateral forms to lessen the sting of asymmetry. This meant pushing for more universal forms of contracting—subjecting large and small actors to the same rules—and diffusing decision-making across the Americas through more effective multilateralism. This push had notable roots, predating even the formal creation of the Pan American Union (Long and Schulz, forthcoming). However, it took on new urgency in the mid-1940s because dramatic changes to the previously loose and permissive global assemblage raised questions about the regional/global linkage. Latin Americans did not simply try to "close" their hemisphere, though they did defend regional arrangements. Both large states like Brazil and small states like Costa Rica and Uruguay sought to shape the norms, rules, institutions of the emerging global assemblage to gain greater voice there while enhancing the robustness of their regional assemblage.

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